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The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed m December of 
1987 was hailed all over Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union, as a 
momentous step towards reducing the risk of nuclear war Riding on this 
tide of public support, many officials of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and of the Warsaw Pact believe the time is ripe to 
conclude other negotiations on nuclear arms with a treaty on short-range 
weapons or even on strategic missiles But others, especially many in Europe, 
worry that with a decreasing nuclear guarantee, Western Europe will be open 
to a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact While not rejecting the idea of 
more extensive nuclear arms control agreements they feel that the 
conventional balance must be addressed first
It is commonly heard that the Warsaw Pact is superior in 
conventional weapons This belief is shared by many Congress, the 
President, respected newspapers, and European officials Problems have 
arisen within NATO on how to counter this alleged superiority An obvious 
solution for many defense experts is to increase conventional force levels 
This raises a difficult question within the alliance which countries should 
increase their NATO expenditures7 Neither the Europeans nor the 
Americans are eager to expand their defense budgets Some Europeans accuse 
the United States of failing to live up to its NATO commitment, some in the 
US insist that the Europeans do not want to pay their own defense bill and 
rely too heavily on the US
This paper explores the feasibility of a different approach Instead of 
increasing conventional force levels and encouraging further inner-Alliance 
cleavages, NATO s next step should be a reduction of offensive forces on both 
sides of the inter-German border A first step m this direction is to create a 
zone that restricts the presence of the most offensive of the conventional 
ground-force weapons systems, tanks This paper evaluates that possibility It 
examines the current level of conventional forces in Europe, with an 
emphasis on tank systems It studies the reasoning m support of a limited 
arms control agreement It presents a plan that could be the basis for a new 
set of conventional arms negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
countries
The Conventional Forces Balance
In order to make a lasting, significant treaty on conventional forces in Europe, 
it is necessary to understand how the situation stands today A popular idea 
exists that Warsaw Pact forces are superior" to NATO forces While experts 
agree that the Pact has more weapons in most conventional categories, there 
is no consensus that this makes the Pact forces better A realistic evaluation 
requires more than a numerical comparison Beyond the Bean Count, a
2publication by a Senate Armed Services subcommittee, lists thirteen mam 
categories for evaluating the conventional balance m Europe
1 Deployment of Forces—the capability of Soviet forces to mount a 
surprise attack and the ability of NATO to provide effective defense
2 Quantity of Major Weapons Systems (the 7 Bean Count7 )
3 Quality of Major Weapons Systems
4 Force Readiness
5 Force Sustainability
6 Number of Active and Reserve Personnel
7 Quality of Personnel
8 Interoperability of Forces
9 Command Control, Communications, and Intelligence
10 Reliability of Allies
11 Geographic Factors
12 Ability to Make Rapid Transition to War1
Arguments that NATO forces are inferior based solely on bean counts 
are misleading because they fail to explain the complexities involved in 
evaluating military strength Wars are never won or lost because of a single 
factor, not even when that factor covers the number of troops or weapons 
History is replete with examples of wars that were won by the smaller force 
the battles of Austerlitz, Fredericksburg, the invasion of Russia, the North 
Korean invasion, the battles in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and even the 
Falklands War 2 Other factors come into play in any conflict and even the 
most detailed numerical comparisons cannot evaluate them Raw numerical 
data do not assess the differences in technology, logistical support, willingness 
to endure attrition, willingness to give up territory, various tactics used, or 
difference in goals 3 Bean-counting is useful because it can give parameters to 
a discussion on force effectiveness, but it is dangerous to ignore these other 
factors that can affect the outcome of a war and to concentrate only on 
numbers of systems or people This section looks at thirteen factors to 
comprehensively evaluate the conventional balance An emphasis is placed 
on the balance of tanks within that whole where applicable
Deployment of Forces
One of NATO's mam concerns today is the peacetime deployment of Pact 
forces NATO strategists worry that the Soviets have the ability to launch a 
surprise or minimum warning attack against Western Europe and it is a 
legitimate concern In order to evaluate this capability, three factors must be 
considered the location of the active-duty forces, their readiness, and their 
deployment m relation to the terrain 4
Warsaw Pact forces are deployed to take maximum advantage of a 
major flaw m NATO planning The logistical support lines that serve all of 
NATO forces come in through ports in the Benelux countries and run 
parallel to the front, from north to south 5 This part of Germany has the land 
best suited to attack by Pact forces, because it is comparatively flat6 German, 
Dutch British, and Belgian forces are assigned to the defense of this area, but 
most of the Belgian and Dutch forces are not even in Germany, and would 
require mobilization and travel time The German forces in place would be 
spread thinly to cover for the others until they arrive Three divisions of US 
forces are the only reserves assigned for the region and only one brigade is in 
Germany The equipment for two of the divisions is kept in the rear areas as 
part of the POMCUS (Pre-Positioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) 
program, but the soldiers would have to be flown over once mobilization has 
occurred 7 Looking at this situation would be quite satisfying to a Warsaw 
Pact planner, NATO's most important supply lines are the most vulnerable 
If Pact forces were to successfully push through NATO forces, they could effect 
NATOs war effort
The doctrine of Flexible Response provides for a strong conventional 
line of defense on the inter-German border The above passage shows it 
simply is not there m peacetime Official estimates claim it would take from 
one to three days to move active duty forces into their "General Defense 
Positions 8 The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, deploys its most ready 
forces forward during peacetime 9
The number of forces within the central region, then, does not 
sufficiently explain how dangerous the situation could be for NATO The 
overall balance of forces in the central European region is fairly equal10 But 
the balance within one hundred miles of the inter-German border is not,11 
and it is this forward deployment of ready Warsaw Pact forces that forms the 
threat to NATO The result is that some of NATO s weakest defense forces 
face some of the Warsaw Pact's strongest offensive forces Soviet doctrine, as 
stated by Soviet defense officials, calls for rapid, sudden breakthroughs that 
overwhelm before the enemy can fully mobilize 12 This region is a likely 
target for implementing such a plan, and the current deployment makes such 
a breakthrough plausible The deployment of forces remains one of the most 
serious threats to NATOs conventional defense
Quantity
Of course, the numbers are important The actual numbers of weapons 
systems and personnel, however, are hard to establish accurately The figures 
supplied by the Warsaw Pact do not always match up with those obtained by 
Western intelligence As far as tanks are concerned, NATO uses two methods 
to obtain the actual count the production method and the divisional
4strength method 13 The former involves estimates of the capacity and output 
of the mam Soviet tank factories, and how they may have improved or 
declined over time Allowances for exports and retirement from service are 
made, and a total is given The divisional strength method estimates the 
number of tanks that would be needed to equip all of the current Soviet 
divisions Adjustments are then made for whether the division is in or out 
of Eastern Europe, the existence of independent tank regiments that were 
introduced in the Group of Soviet Forces Europe (GSFE) in the late 1970 s and 
1980 s, and the reserve tanks for training 14 Although the two methods come 
up with generally similar numbers, they attest to the difficulties in 
determining Soviet tank levels
Numerical comparisons are complicated for other reasons as well 
NATO military leaders tend to operate under worse-case scenario planning 
This often leads them to use selective information For example, the UK 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) excludes NATO tanks that would take two weeks 
to mobilize and arrive at the front, yet includes Pact tanks that are for use by 
only partially-manned divisions and would take weeks, if not months, after 
mobilization to be battle-ready 15 Counts vary by scope, region, and 
definitions, and those differences are reflected m the outcomes The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a respected and oft-cited 
source, offers three questions to evaluate before any given count
1 Which forces are included and which are not7
2 How are the categories grouped, both in terms of geography and 
equipment types7
3 How is combat effectiveness and readiness of equipment and units 
presented716
With this preface, IISS offers the following numerical data for main 
battle tanks (MBT)
NATQ Quis lings Arg? Atlantic to Urals
NATO WP NATO WP
MBT 12 700 18 000 22 200 52 20017
These numbers show that the Warsaw Pact does have a numerical advantage 
over the West in tanks A problem arises m negotiations, however, when 
Western numbers do not equal or agree with those provided by the Warsaw 
Pact One of the most difficult problems at the Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions (MBFR) talks in Vienna was this inability to agree on the levels of 
tanks and other forces One of the beauties of a restricted tank zone is that it 
nicely sidesteps the whole problem, as will be illustrated later
5Quality
So far the picture is not particularly comforting for NATO The quality of 
forces used in the battle however could be decisive Both the East and the 
West are making technical improvements in their equipment, and both sides 
have some advantages NATO is generally credited, however, with having 
an advantage in over-all quality of weapons systems 18 How does the quality 
of tank systems compare7
There are four mam factors m assessing tank quality observation, fire 
power mobility, and armour protection 19 NATO tanks have a comparative 
advantage in all of them
Battles are usually quite confusing and it may become difficult for 
soldiers inside a tank to know what is going on outside It is imperative, 
however that they be able to see one way or another The early Soviet 
tanks—the T-54, T-55, and T-62, are all considered to be of much lower quality 
in this category than any NATO tank built after 1950 20 Soviet tank 
commanders still have to stick their heads out of the tank in order to see the 
battle 21 The Soviets still must use active' night vision, such as white or 
infrared searchlights which makes them easy to spot NATO, however has 
developed a passive" form of illumination, thermal imaging The result is 
that at night or during the confusion of battle, we can see them, but they 
cannot see us 22
The quality of firepower is determined by the type of guns and 
ammunition used and the capability of the sights and fire control In older 
tanks, such as the Leopard 1, the M-48A5, the M-60A3, and the early versions 
of the M-l Abrams, the West uses the British-made L7 (rifled) 105 
millimeter 23 It fires faster and with more force than the D10T, used m older 
Pact tanks The Pact gamed an advantage in force with its T-62 tank, but this 
was largely offset by its inaccuracy Although NATO has not significantly 
improved the L7, it still fires heavier shells over longer distances than any of 
the Soviet guns 24 The extensive use of ballistic computers on most of its 
tanks has given NATO the advantage in the sights used for targeting and m 
fire control
Mobility of tanks is divided into two categories tactical and 
operational 25 Tactical mobility involves how easily a tank can move m a 
battle, and operational mobility involves getting the tanks to the battle The 
most recent NATO tanks, the Leopard 2 and the M-l, have the advantage in 
the first category by providing a higher power weight ratio and a better design 
for the terrain 26 TTiey have the advantage in the latter category by bemg more 
reliable 27
6Finally, NATO tanks have, m general, better armor NATO took and 
has retained the technical lead in fitting their tanks with composite armor 28 
The Pact appears to have been unable to develop this type of armor and has 
developed its own reactive armor instead 29 The poor engine strength of their 
tanks, however, has severely impeded the ability to apply their technologies 
because the tanks cannot support the additional weight30 Therefore, almost 
all T-54, T-55 and T 62 tanks in service, together accounting for 70 percent of 
the Warsaw Pact fleet are fitted with neither composite nor reactive 
armor 31
Force Readiness
How well prepared each side s standing forces are for battle could determine 
whether or not the battle is won within the first few days The speed with 
which forces can mobilize is important If a victory is not reached within the 
first week or so, how quickly reinforcements can be brought to the front also 
becomes important
Traditionally, there has been a trade-off between a troop s size and its 
readiness The choices of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact reflect 
their differing doctrines and strategies NATO places a greater emphasis on 
readiness than size due to the fact that its doctrine is defensive It must be 
prepared to face the large-scale attack that the Pact s doctrine favors 32
NATO divides its forces into four levels of readiness, C-l through C-4 
C-l is fully ready, has at least 90 percent of its personnel and equipment there, 
with 90 percent of the equipment being rated mission capable, and needs 
fewer than two weeks of training C-2 is substantially ready, has 80 percent of 
its personnel and equipment, and 70 percent of the equipment rated as 
mission capable, but needs three to four weeks training C-3 is marginally 
ready, has only 70percent of its personnel, 65 percent of its equipment (only 60 
percent of which is mission capable) and needs five to six weeks to tram 
Finally, C-4 is not ready with just 65 percent of the necessary personnel and 
equipment, and needing some seven weeks to be ready for battle 33 Anything 
above C-4 is considered combat ready and in 1981, fifteen of the sixteen 
active duty U S Army divisions were rated above C-4 34
Soviet divisions are ranked by NATO in three categories Category I, 
which includes one-fourth of all Soviet divisions and all thirty of the ones m 
Eastern Europe, has a minimum of 75 percent of its personnel, 100 percent of 
its weapons, and can be ready for combat within 24 hours Category II, 
however, could take anywhere from 3 to 30 days to be ready and is 
maintained at only 50 to 75 percent strength Category III divisions have at
7best 10 to 20 percent of their manpower and would take 90 to 120 days 
Almost half of the Soviet divisions are m this last category 35
As can be seen from the numbers above the lowest rated combat ready 
NATO division is better manned and equipped than the Soviet s second 
ranked division Since Category I divisions may be missing as much as one- 
fourth of their strength, even they may be less prepared than the C-3 
divisions 36
As far as the other factors that make up readiness are concerned, NATO 
enjoys a clear superiority The Soviets do not have reserve units in the 
Western sense, and their rear support services are not always manned during 
peacetime The reservists are not told in advance which units they would be 
assigned to replace and probably will not have trained with those units 37 
Their training program m general, pales m comparison to the West s They 
do not have a separate basic training for conscripts and the training they do 
receive is much less extensive NATO exercises are both larger and more 
realistic 38 In sum, the general preparedness of NATO s active duty forces and 
its reserve forces is much higher than that of its Pact counterparts, and this 
would surely be a significant factor m any conventional conflict m Europe
Sustainability
As with force readiness, doctrine and strategy are important in the planning 
that affects each side s sustainability NATO s doctrine of nuclear deterrence 
helps to explain why it lacks sufficient stockpiles of consumable material 
NATO nations disagree among themselves as to the value of conventional 
sustainability and thus the existing supply of stockpiles is not large This is 
one of NATO s most severe problems because it faces a Warsaw Pact force 
that forward deploys stockpiles m Eastern Europe that the West estimates will 
last 60 to 90 days 39 The Pact has considerable logistic problems, however, and 
its ability to move its supplies to the front line within 10 to 12 days becomes 
more questionable with time 40 While the Warsaw Pact is presently credited 
with the advantage, it is not an overwhelming one, and it would likely 
change soon after the outbreak of war 41
Number of Active and Reserve Personnel and Quality of Personnel
These two categories are important to the over-all balance of forces in Europe, 
but of less importance to the question of tank restrictions For that reason, 
little attention is paid to them here
8The question of comparative troop levels is similar to the question of 
comparative tank levels discussed earlier, answers depend on who is 
counting and where they count IISS lists them as roughly equal
The quality of the forces is measured in terms of training, morale and 
leadership 43 These criteria are difficult to quantify and many sources are 
reluctant to do so, but they do influence the effectiveness of the force In all 
three categories NATO is rated higher than the Warsaw Pact The impact of 
each quality, however, would certainly vary with each battle The general 
morale of each side, for example, could depend on whether it was winning or 
losing
Interoperability of Forces
This category evaluates the ability of each alliance to share ammunition, 
spare parts, and fuel between partners, here, the advantage is clearly to the 
Pact 44 This is due largely to the Soviet Union s ability to command 
consistency within the Warsaw Pact and the ardent independence of the 
NATO countries in armament production 45
Command Control, Communications and Intelligence
Command Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) is difficult to 
evaluate as a unit It involves how well each alliance s command structure 
would perform during a war and the technological capabilities of intelligence- 
gathering equipment and communications networks 46 Like the personnel 
category C3I is important to the balance of power as a whole, but not as 
important for the conventional arms control plan presented in this paper 
NATO's C3I is rated higher as a unit than the Pact's centralized command 
structure and that gives it an advantage at the theater level47 An edge in 
operations would be most important at the outset of war, but if the battle lasts 
for more than a few days, the advantage will start to swing towards NATO 48
Reliability of Allies
The reliability factor may be one of the most important of all the factors 
discussed here The cohesiveness of each alliance could make the difference 
between winning and losing a war
NATO Guidelines Area
NATO WP
Atlantic to Urals
NATO WP
2 385 000 2 292 000
4 371 000 4 276 00042
Active forces 796 000 995 000
Reserve forces 922 000 1 030 000
9NATO members can hardly be accused of having monolithic 
approaches to policy, yet there is little doubt that they would respond in 
unison to an actual attack Even though France is not officially part of 
NATO s military structure, French leaders have indicated that they would 
send in troops 49 The potential problem NATO faces is one of agreeing to 
mobilize in the face of Pact mobilization 50
The Soviets, however, have far more serious problems with their 
allies Their very deployment of forces in Eastern European countries, 
indicates insecurity about non-Soviet Pact support51 The Soviets also deny 
their allies top grade equipment to ensure that it cannot be used against their 
own forces 52 It is hard to imagine that Poland and Czechoslovakia would not 
defend their homelands if they were attacked, but it is questionable whether 
they would help the Soviets invade Western Europe The advantage is to 
NATO m this category
Economic and Industrial Strength
A nation s military strength is largely a reflection of the economic resources 
the country can dedicate to defense The strength of a country s industry 
directly affects its ability to sustain a war The economies of the West have a 
clear advantage in this category and this advantage would become more 
apparent the longer the war lasts 53
Geography
West Germany provides a very shallow" area for defense NATO s north 
and central army groups are deployed approximately 200 kilometers (km) 
west of the border while mam supply lines and 90 percent of the support 
facilities and air bases are only another 100 km back 54 NATO forces could not 
afford to retreat more than about 150 km from the border
Yet, being a defensive force gives the NATO forces a significant 
advantage They will not have the element of surprise m their favor, but 
they know the land well from having trained there The north German plain 
is comparatively flat, but not as flat as the open steppe on which the Soviets 
tram 55 North Germany has a number of natural and man-made obstacles 
that would allow the Soviets to attempt a conventional attack, and NATO 
logically concentrates its defense efforts at these points, rather than stringing 
troops and equipment out along the entire border 56 In addition, these attack 
routes are quite narrow and the Pact forces would have to remain m tight 
columns until they gamed significant ground 57 They would make good 
targets for NATO s air defenses
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If the Soviets are able to convince or coerce the rest of the Warsaw Pact 
into supporting the war effort, East Germany and Poland become one big 
geographical staging area for bringing in troops, equipment, and supplies 
although the area is vulnerable to air attack NATO s reinforcement units in 
contrast would have to travel over either the Atlantic Ocean or the English 
Channel Sea travel is slower than land or rail passage and it could take 
NATO countries anywhere from two to four weeks to bring reinforcements to 
the front58
In terms of geography then, the advantage to NATO is only during the 
first few days of the war If the Soviets are able to push NATO forces back 
more than 150 km, NATO would risk losing most of its support facilities and 
its main supply line, and possibly, the war
When all factors are considered, the conventional balance in Europe 
today is stable Neither side has a clear advantage and neither side is likely to 
think it could easily mount a successful surprise attack during peacetime But 
the balance is not always stable So while the distribution of advantage is 
good, it is not good enough for either side to feel secure The need for 
conventional arms control becomes especially apparent when the discussion 
turns to nuclear disarmament
Tank-Restricted Power as Arms Control
The likelihood of an overt military attack by the Soviet Union in order to 
dominate Western Europe is quite small The Soviets have enough trouble 
supporting the current communist regimes m Eastern Europe and enough 
domestic economic problems that to attempt such a takeover would be 
foolish But, both the United States and the Soviet Union have their greatest 
concentration of forces m central Europe, and the possibility remains that 
tensions outside of the region—in the Middle East or South Africa, for 
example—could escalate and drive the superpowers to war in central Europe 
Conventional reductions are still needed, then, even if the direct threat from 
the Soviets is no longer a strong probability, to reduce the incentives for a 
preemptive conventional attack when international tensions are high
This plan does not solve all of Europe s security problems, but that is 
not its purpose Any agreement which buys time for political and diplomatic 
processes, and delays an initial military confrontation in Europe that could 
escalate into a nuclear exchange, is of value enough in and of itself to be 
pursued seriously The world is imperfect and no arms control measures yet 
conceived will solve all problems for both sides Yet marginal improvements 
can and should be made A tank-restricted zone would be one such 
improvement
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Jonathan Dean, former US Ambassador to the MBFR talks, proposed a 
zone free of all offensive systems—tanks self-propelled artillery, and attack 
helicopters that would cover 100 km west and 150 km east of the mter- 
German border 59 This is a type of non-provocative defense, a concept that 
urges each side to pull out all of their offensive weapons but leave their 
defensive weapons m place This is a goal NATO planners should keep in 
mind when formulating negotiations but it is too much to expect m one step 
Dean himself argues that arms control negotiations should move 
cautiously 60 Arms control is meant to increase stability, too much of a 
change could decrease stability It would also be politically difficult to achieve 
if either side believed it was giving up too much at once Dean s proposal 
would be better if a completely free zone was the long-term goal, but a tank- 
restricted zone would be the first step
Tanks as Offensive Systems
Tanks are the best starting point for restrictions because m a purely 
conventional attack, it is impossible to break through either side s defense 
lines without them Neither armored personnel carriers (APC s) nor self- 
propelled artillery are sufficient for a breakthrough The armor on each is too 
thm and they are vulnerable to any conventional missile 61 Each side's air 
forces have enough power to destroy a given area, but airpower cannot hold 
the land In central Europe, there is no reason to use conventional forces 
unless the attacker wants the land Simple destruction could be accomplished 
at a lower cost with nuclear weapons
The presence of tanks is also comparatively easy to verify From the air 
a column of tanks can be spotted at a distance of sixty to eighty miles The 
steel content of the tanks makes them relatively easy to find on a radar as 
well62
Finally, tanks are the best political choice because they are the most 
offensive of the conventional ground force weapons systems NATO could 
gam considerable public support both in Europe and at home, by proposing to 
restrict offensive tank systems while allowing all defensive systems to remain 
in place In this way, it could win back some popular support from Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev Gorbachev s apparent break with the approach to 
arms control of his predecessors, has won the backing of many Europeans 
who now view NATO, and especially the United States as the intransigents 
in arms control
12
Restricted Zone versus Free Zone
There are a number of attractive aspects in proposing a tank-restricted 
area instead of a straight reduction of forces The main advantage is that no 
country has to give up any of its tanks No leadership must leave its country 
m a militarily weakened position No bureaucracy is forced to give up part of 
its budget No country is asked to give up sovereignty over the combat use of 
its weapons The only change is m the tanks location
Moreover this plan avoids some of the problems that have brought 
the MBFR talks to a standstill The mam problem has been an inability of the 
two sides to agree on the existing troop levels MBFR tried to set ceilings for 
troop levels, and would require each side to withdraw forces to stay under 
those ceilings The actual number of troops each side would have to pull out 
varies quite a bit depending on whose data are used 63 A tank-restricted plan 
avoids the problem in two ways First, the plan deals with tanks, not people, 
and the presence of tanks is easier to verify Second, the number of tanks 
allowed to remain would be so low that it would be easier to tell if there were 
flagrant violations, and minor violations would not be militarily significant
Acceptability
NATO countries have nothing to lose from this agreement Soviet tanks 
would be placed at such a distance from the front that they would not be able 
to recover their position before NATO forces reached the front While it does 
not guarantee NATO security for now and forever, the scheme does reduce 
the potential threat to Western Europe Its success could also be the 
foundation on which to build more extensive arms control agreements
The Soviets are more likely to accept a tank-restricted area than a 
completely free zone, mainly for political reasons If there is an uprising in 
an Eastern European country, the Soviets may not be willing to leave the 
government on its own to suppress it Tanks by themselves, are not efficient 
weapons for suppressing local disturbances, but a few tanks parked on the 
borders of a capital city or outside of a factory full of striking workers can have 
an enormous effect on the courage and morale of the agitators
The issue here is to distinguish between the type and number of tanks 
needed for this sort of "police ' function and the type and number needed to 
successfully invade Western Europe This is not a difficult distinction to 
make The Soviet T-54, T-55, and T-62's, for example, are all sufficiently 
threatening when used against striking workers, but are not reliable enough 
to seriously threaten Western Europe None of the three types can be 
significantly upgraded 64 A limited number of them m Eastern Europe would 
allow the Soviets to keep control but not tempt them to head west
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It should be noted here that it is not the goal of NATO to allow the 
Soviet Union to repress Eastern European protests It is the responsibility of 
NATO planners to design an arms control agreement that is both effective 
and acceptable to both sides However much Western countries may support 
the Polish Solidarity movement, for example they must accept the political 
reality that the Soviets are unlikely to make large concessions on this type of 
issue right now If NATO attempts to deny the Soviets hegemony m this 
area it will forfeit the opportunity to talk m an unprecedented way with the 
Soviets on conventional arms control In the long run, if there are significant 
reductions in conventional and nuclear forces, the Soviets may feel more 
secure about granting greater independence to the Eastern block countries but 
they cannot be rushed into reducing their control NATO must have the 
patience to move slowly and to accept small gams gradually, rather than risk 
the chance for any benefits at all by challenging Soviet authority in Eastern 
Europe
This plan avoids the zero-sum ' concept of arms control, where one 
side s gam is met by the other side s loss Both sides can make significant 
gams without making significant concessions This promotes the feeling that 
both sides are working toward a common goal The gams from that could be 
reaped later during negotiations for more extensive force reductions, for both 
nuclear and conventional weapons
Tank Restricted Zone Specific Issues
There are five mam issues that diplomats and strategists must address to 
construct a tank-restricted zone placement, logistics (as a function of 
distance), positioning, verification, and time This final section discusses the 
problems in each of these categories and provides some solutions for them
Placement
Placement is a political problem, more so for the NATO countries than for 
the Warsaw Pact If tanks are restricted within a certain zone in central 
Europe, what is to be done with the tanks that are already there7
On the Pact side, the Soviets can pull their tanks back into the Soviet 
Union But that still leaves the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and East German 
tanks to contend with Would each country be willing to move its tanks out 
of the country, and possibly into the Soviet Union7 They may not have 
much of a choice Here the Soviet's hegemony in the region could work to 
NATO's advantage, albeit in a Machiavellian way The Soviets could
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command the placement of the Eastern block tanks out of their respective 
countries if it meant that NATO tanks would be pulled out of West Germany
The political problems of tank relocation are much more difficult for 
NATO The United States Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
could confine all of their tanks to Belgium and the Netherlands, but this 
would take a great deal of mner-alliance negotiation The Dutch and Belgian 
people may not be enthusiastic initially, at the idea of an influx of tanks in 
their respective homelands They would have to accept the idea as the first 
part of a larger plan and that the tanks are not meant to be there indefinitely 
They would have to be willing to take the risk m the belief that the success of 
the tank-restricted zone could lead to real reductions, in which American and 
British tanks would then leave Belgium and the Netherlands They would 
have to take the risk that it could be a long time before the next phase 
happened This may not be an insurmountable task if they accept the premise 
of the plan, that it will increase stability by decreasing the potential for a 
conventional first strike
What about the West German tanks7 The first option to explore 
should be that of moving them into France Franco-German military 
cooperation is on the rise the September 1987, Saucy Sparrow joint exercise m 
Bavaria was significantly east of the boundaries France set for its exercises in 
1966 65 French President François Mitterrand claimed the exercise proved 
France s ability to help West Germany quickly once the political decision to 
do so had been made 66 In addition, French forces may soon be conducting 
joint exercises with other NATO forces in Europe 67 The French are even 
considering establishing a Franco-German Defense Council to give political 
guidance (although it would have no legal authority) to movement towards 
greater military cooperation 68 All of these measures build upon the 1963 
Elysee Treaty The willingness of the French to upgrade their political and 
military commitments to Germany is seen by many, including high-level 
German officials, as a move toward greater commitment to NATO as a 
whole The German State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense asserts that,
The governments of both countries have also made it quite plain 
that their common purpose is to strengthen the Alliance with 
their cooperation over military and security policy to 
support the forward defence m the Central Region and to 
facilitate French participation in the common defence 69
Within this context of greater French participation in the European 
defense effort, the idea of German tanks stationed in France does not seem 
unrealistic It accords the French a significant role m NATO without 
demanding that the French formally rejoin the actual military structure
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The necessary roles of the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch 
underscore the importance of Western cooperation before the negotiations 
begin The United States cannot simply negotiate with the Soviets as they did 
on the INF Treaty German participation was required then, but was more 
easily realized because West Germany was the only other NATO country 
involved and the treaty involved the removal of weapons The restricted 
zone on the other hand, requires the stationing of American British, and 
German tanks on the soil of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France Their 
agreement and participation is imperative
Logistics
The backbone of the plan is to move each side s tanks back far enough to 
diminish their ability to execute a surprise attack How far back is far enough7
Tanks do not drive to the war They are brought in by rail or on trucks 
There are a limited number of railroads and roadways on either side that 
could be used m a mass mobilization The Soviets, for example, have only 
four or five railroads that run from their border, through Poland and East 
Germany to the central front region Trains must stop at the Soviet-Polish 
border because European trams run on a more narrow gauge track than do 
Soviet trams 70 These transportation choke points' 71 are prime targets for 
NATO air strikes NATO s air forces could not only destroy the tracks 
themselves, but would destroy the cars, too Tracks are easily replaced, 
railway cars are not72 The roadway needed for trucks to move tanks in could 
be destroyed in a similar manner If Pact tanks are pulled back to the Soviet 
Union, any attempt to mobilize would likely be stopped before they got very 
far into Poland 73
The plan m effect, is asymmetrical m terms of distance, with Pact tanks 
back farther than NATO tanks This is not the main aim of the agreement it 
is more a function of geography But this will not necessarily preclude Soviet 
acceptance of the agreement In May, 1987, the Warsaw Pact stated, in 
reference to conventional reductions, that the Pact is willing to remove any 
disparity that may have arisen in some elements in the course of reductions 
by bringing about a reduction on the side of the one who has an advantage 74 
Gorbachev himself stated the need for the elimination of asymmetry and 
imbalance [m conventional forces] by reducing, accordingly, the arms of the 
power that is in the lead 75 This is an unprecedented acknowledgement 
on the part of the Soviet Union of the existence of their numerical advantage 
in conventional force levels, and a willingness to correct it In theory, NATO 
may be able to extend this acceptance of an asymmetrical reduction to an 
acceptance of an asymmetrical tank-restricted zone The latter may actually be 
more amenable to the Soviets because they are allowed to retain, for the time 
being, their numerical advantage This may help Gorbachev counter internal
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Soviet criticism from hard-liners who attack him for conceding too much to 
NATO
Positioning
Where will the tanks be parked specifically, once they reach their country of 
destination7 There are two answers to this question The first is to park the 
tanks in designated camps The second is to allow them to be dispersed their 
location restricted only by the host country
The latter is the better choice Parking the tanks in specific camps 
would make verification easier any movement out of the camps would be 
quickly noted But the camps would also make attractive targets if 
international tensions were high Either side could be tempted to eliminate 
the other s tanks with either air strikes or ballistic missiles Since the purpose 
of the agreement is to reduce the temptations for such preemptive strikes, the 
tanks should be dispersed throughout the area behind the boundaries of the 
restricted zone This may hamper verification somewhat, but not by much 
A large line of tanks, with enough numbers to launch an attack, would be 
relatively easy to spot That much armour would surely show on a radar 
even from great distances 76 The bulk of the verification will be aimed at the 
restricted zone and at the appropriate transportation routes that lead to it 
What each country does with its tanks is not critical as long as they are out of 
the zone
Verification
Verification would be comprised of both human and technical types The 
intensive verification measures needed for this agreement have their 
precedent in two earlier agreements the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the INF Treaty 
The former was the first to allow surprise inspections and observation of the 
other s alliance military exercises In the INF Treaty, verification reached 
new heights by allowing on-site inspection of both production and 
elimination facilities The principles embodied m each could be extended to 
cover a restricted zone
Outside of the restricted zone, satellite and air surveillance would 
continue over central Europe Human observers could be placed at critical 
transportation points, such as where the rail cars must change tracks on the 
Soviet-Polish border and along the highways that would be likely 
mobilization routes Comparable points could be found on the NATO side 
Within the zone, verification would have to be intensive to insure that the
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number of tanks did not exceed the allowable limits Here, it may be 
necessary for each side to know exactly where the other s tanks are
A Warsaw Pact statement in 1986 called for the creation of an 
international commission that would consist of representatives from both 
alliances and representatives from the non-aligned nations They suggest 
that this committee be a part of the on-site verification process to ensure 
objectivity 77 This may be possible, but NATO should be cautious as to which 
of the non-aligned countries are represented It would be possible for the 
Warsaw Pact to try to build an anti-Western coalition Some sort of veto 
power over the non-aligned nations membership should be given to each 
alliance Each side could reject a set number of countries
Time
The final main issue is to design a timetable for the agreement It is necessary 
to remember that speed is not a goal in and of itself, stability is If a rapid tank 
pull-back creates more instability than it eliminates, the tanks should be 
pulled back in a phased manner Each side could pull 15 to 25 percent of their 
tanks back m the first year and examine the results This would allow nations 
to analyze their verification methods and work out any political difficulties 
If the plan seems to be working the percent reduction for the remaining 
tanks could be increased The pull-back could be completed within five to ten 
years
Remaining Details
As with all treaties, a committee would be appointed to hear complaints on 
cheating or to work out any interpretation problems They would review the 
treaty after the first year, the fifth year, and every five years thereafter The 
treaty would have indefinite duration and any country could withdraw with 
six month s notice
Conclusion
The success of this agreement could lead to greater conventional and nuclear 
reductions Other offensive conventional forces, such as armored 
personnel carriers and attack helicopters could be next to be pulled out of the 
restricted zone Perhaps, with the success of the treaty over a significant 
period, the restricted zone could be turned into a purely free zone, depending 
mainly on developments within Eastern Europe Either way, a successful 
treaty on a restricted zone should calm enough fears in both alliances that 
significant headway could be made on strategic force reductions
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It is prime time to discuss conventional reductions Both alliances will 
have financial difficulties if they increase spending on conventional 
weapons Prominent defense specialists both in and out of government, in 
both alliances are calling for conventional reductions The tank-restricted 
zone described in this paper would add security and stability in Europe 
possibly set the stage for more extensive conventional and nuclear arms 
control agreements, promote inner-alliance cooperation, and cause no 
financial or security risks to NATO members NATO countries now have the 
opportunity to conclude a successful treaty on conventional weapons with 
the Warsaw Pact countries It would be foolish for them not to take 
advantage of it
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